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The need for capital financing is an on-going issue affecting individuals, organizations and 
ultimately the economy of a country. Leasing is considered an asset based financing. It allows 
the lessee to pay the leasing rentals through the cash flows generated from the use of the asset 
in the business operations. In this context operational leases can be seen as an alternative for 
companies to broaden their options regarding assets acquisition. 
Leaseurope annual report for 2011 depicts significant differences in leasing usage across 
countries. The reasons for the decision making between leasing and purchasing are very 
different across the countries in the report. So, the aim of the thesis is to study one of the 
factors that may impact the decision making by challenging operational leases as an 
alternative to purchase, from a fiscal perspective. Research intends to determine if there is any 
evidence that fiscal rules are a critical factor in the choice for operational lease. To examine 
the relation between leasing usage and fiscal rules, a cross sectional study across European 
countries was performed. Findings show that there is no evidence that fiscal rules play a 
determinant role in the choice to use operational leases. The results also show that leasing 
usage follows the GDP growth trends. As GDP growth increases, leasing usage shows higher 
levels of growth than total investment growth. This means that as the percentage of GDP 




A necessidade de financiamento é uma questão central e constante que influencia indivíduos, 
organizações e, por fim, a economia de um país. A locação é considerada uma forma de 
financiamento com base em activos, permitindo ao locatário satisfazer os custos da locação 
através de proveitos gerados a partir do uso desses activos nas suas operações comerciais. 
Neste contexto as locações operacionais podem ser vistas como uma alternativa para as 
empresas ampliarem as suas opções para aquisição de activos. 
O relatório anual da Leaseurope para 2011 evidência diferenças significativas no uso de 
locação entre os países. As razões subjacentes à decisão de locação versus compra são muito 
diferentes entre os países considerados no relatório. Assim, o objectivo da tese é desafiar a 
locação operacional enquanto alternativa à compra do ponto de vista fiscal. O estudo pretende 
determinar se existem evidências de que as políticas fiscais constituem um factor crítico para 
escolha da locação operacional. Para analisar a relação entre o uso de locação e as políticas 
fiscais, foi realizado um estudo seccional entre países europeus. Os resultados mostram que 
não existem evidências de que as políticas fiscais tenham um papel determinante na escolha 
de locação operacional. Evidenciam ainda, que o uso de locação segue as tendências de 
crescimento do PIB. Com o aumento de crescimento do PIB, o uso de locação apresenta um 
crescimento mais acentuado do que o investimento. Isto significa que à medida que o 
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Capital financing assumes a central role in society and is a fundamental tool for economic 
growth. Considering the need and impact of funding, which starts at an individual decision 
point, develops into an organizational level and culminates in an economic effect, it becomes 
relevant to study available options for access to financing. When exploring funding options, 
companies should consider more than the financial side since funding decisions are, actually, 
closely linked to a company’s strategy. 
Many factors impact the lending and borrowing behaviour and nowadays on top of 
everyone’s mind is the economic crisis. However, other factors are key as well, namely 
market imperfections, a timeless and structural issue, that arise from uncertainty and 
asymmetric information between the demand and the supply sides (Kraemer-Eis and Lang, 
2012). 
In the context of capital financing, leasing can be seen as an alternative for companies to 
broaden their access to short and medium-term financing; yet in this thesis the aim is to 
challenge leasing as an alternative to purchasing. 
The decision of purchasing versus leasing from a corporate finance perspective is examined 
on the basis of Modigliani and Miller (1958) theory of perfect capital markets (where 
companies’ capital structure is irrelevant for the calculation of the firm value). Akerlof (1970) 
pointed out in their research that market imperfections are part of reality and ignoring them is 
introducing an error that significantly changes the outcome. This means that market 
imperfections are not a cause neither a result of economic crisis, actually they are prevalent in 
the financial markets. Based on this, it is pertinent for business and economic environment 
that companies try to diversify their funding options and uncover ways to substitute 
traditional sources of financing (Akerlof, 1970). 
Fletcher et al (2005) clarifies the notion of leasing by saying that it is based on the assumption 
that profits are generated by the lessee through the use of the asset since no cash is provided 
from a credit entity but only the asset (as opposed to a loan). Moreover, International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 17 dating from march 2010, states that “a lease is an agreement 
whereby the lessor conveys to the lessee, in return for a payment or series of payments, the 
right to use an asset for an agreed period of time”. Leasing is here denoted as an asset based 
financing and it can be said that leasing allows the lessee to generate cash flows from the 
business operations and asset exploitation (asset turnover) to afford the lease payments. In 
fact any type of leasing fit that concept, however it is important to differentiate and 
2 
 
characterized leasing alternatives. Leasing agreements can be divided into two major 
categories, financial leases and operational leases. Financial lease is defined by the IAS 17 as 
“a lease that transfers substantially all the risks and rewards incidental to ownership of an 
asset. Title may or may not eventually be transferred”. On the contrary, as lessors retain 
ownership, operational leases separate the legal ownership of an asset from its economic use 
and so the asset is an inherent form of collateral in that type of contracts (Graham et al, 1998; 
Steven and Hein, 1995).  
Specifically, the focus of the thesis is on operational leases which are mostly known for their 
non-monetary advantages. Those advantages may be hard to quantify but they probably 
constitute the most interesting features (from the lessee standpoint) arising from an 
operational lease plan. Some non-monetary benefits are the ability to finance 100% of the 
asset without guarantees or collateral; the flexibility towards customer needs such as the 
variety of contractual provisions or equipment renewal; the agility to easily adapt to the 
fluctuations of the demand; the capacity to improve working capital management by 
spreading payments over the asset’s life time and, because of the dispersal the cash outflows 
the lessee might be able or willing to lease more expensive goods since the risk associated 
with asset turnover and demand fluctuations are reduced (Leaseurope annual report, 2011). 
In this dissertation, leasing is studied from a fiscal perspective. The reason behind the 
decision to study tax implications in leasing versus buying decision was due to the fact that 
non-monetary benefits are somehow transversal across European countries, so what could 
explain the differences in the level of assets under leasing agreements across Europe? Is it part 
of a business culture, unawareness or is the leasing strategy by some fiscal means a 
disadvantage? The baseline of this research is to determine if fiscal rules can explain the 
differences observed in the percentage of assets under operational leasing contracts across 
European countries. Is there evidence that fiscal rules are a critical factor in the choice for 
operational leases? 
To examine the relation between fiscal rules and operational leases, a cross sectional study 
was performed in order to capture the differences across European countries for a given point 
in time. 
The first step to study the possible relation between operational lease in terms of fiscal 
policies and operational lease usage by European country is to quantity the cost associated 
with that type of leasing. The cost of operational lease is the sum of scheduled payments 
made by the lessee to the lessor. However, it is impossible to directly observe the amount paid 
for the operational leases as they are off balance sheet items; yet for the thesis purpose it is 
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acceptable to assess the cost of operational lease by comparing the cash flows from the 
leasing payments with the cash flows from purchasing. In practical terms, we equate the cost 
of operational leasing to the cost of buying, taking into account the timeline where those cash 
flows occur and discounting them to the present value. 
For the metric’s composition, data regarding fiscal policies and risk/cost was collected for the 
year of 2011 since this was the most recent year for which more information across European 
countries was available. Fiscal rules were collected for the 26 countries in the sample from 
existing work from auditing/consulting companies (see KPMG and Deloitte research 
reports
1
). Concerning the depreciation method and rate allowed for tax purposes it is essential 
to define a category of assets to be compared throughout the sample. For that, 
equipment/machinery were selected as they represent a considerable cost for companies and 
involve more than only the acquisition cost such as maintenance and rapid technology 
improvement. For the measurement of the purchasing cost the intention is to replicate, as 
much as possible, the reasoning behind companies decision to buy. Therefore two methods 
have to be considered: acquisition through internal funds or debt issuance. Metrics’ results 
were tested against four variables that measure countries’ economic performance. Results 
from the correlations tested intend to examine countries’ behaviour towards leasing from a 
fiscal perspective but also to evaluate if leasing usage is linked with countries need for 
financing or with the development level, where technology plays a determinant role in highly 
competitive markets. 
In the following sections, it will be presented the literature review that supports the relevance 
of the thematic and shows the key findings up to the date about leasing. Next, it will be 
described the methodology used to measure operational lease cost as well as the data 
collected. Results precede main conclusions and further research where the findings of the 




                                                 
1
 Deloitte (2012). “International tax: Bulgaria Highlights 2012”. 
Deloitte (2012). “International tax: Estonia Highlights 2012”. 
Deloitte (2012). “International tax: Netherlands Highlights 2012”. 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited (2012). “Taxation and Investment in Italy 2012: research, relevance and 
reliability”. 
Leaseurope and KPMG (2012), “European Leasing”, Asset Finance Tax Network Publication 
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2. Literature Review 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 17 dating from 2010, states that “a lease is an 
agreement whereby the lessor conveys to the lessee in return for a payment or series of 
payments the right to use an asset for an agreed period of time.”  
Steven and Hein (1995) and Graham et al (1998) following IAS 17, differentiate leasing 
agreements into finance leasing and operating leasing. Finance leasing consists of “a lease 
that transfers substantially all the risks and rewards incidental to ownership of an asset. Title 
may or may not eventually be transferred”. Ownership risks and costs include accountability 
for loss, wear and tear, and obsolescence, whereas ownership benefits encompasses the right 
of use, gains from asset value appreciation and possession of the property title. Conversely, 
operating lease is a contract other than a finance lease and separates the costs and benefits of 
ownership from the costs and benefits of asset usage (Graham et al, 1998; Steven and Hein, 
1995).  
The purpose of this dissertation is to approach leasing from a fiscal perspective; hence it is 
relevant to highlight fiscal definition about the different types of leasing agreements. 
Accordingly, when the lessor preserves ownership, the contract is considered to be a “true” 
lease. If the lessee holds ownership, it is said to be a lease “intended as security”, and in this 
case lessor’s claim is basically the same as for a secured debt (Steven and Hein, 1995). 
Indeed, arguments in favour of operating leasing partially derive from firms’ ability to keep 
the leased assets and the corresponding financial obligations off their balance sheet and so, 
improving financial ratios. Under current accounting standards criteria to distinguish between 
the types of leasing relies on ownership risks, with lessees of operating leases bearing 
insufficient risk to treat the leased item as an asset and the respective obligations as liabilities, 
and so assets are kept off balance sheet. Critics of this accounting treatment defend that since 
lessees have to be in compliance with specific rules to determine who bears the risks of 
ownership, they can structure contracts in a way that ensures off balance sheet treatment for 
the leased assets (Dhaliwal et al, 2011; Monson, 2001). 
The truth is that operating leases have interesting characteristics for many companies and that 
is why it became the largest type of off balance sheet items, one of the major sources of 
corporate financing and various studies consider it significantly more important than finance 
leases (Dhaliwal et al, 2011; Graham et al., 1998). 
Nonetheless, Dhaliwal et al (2011) found that the positive relation between the implied cost 
of equity and the effect of operating leases on the debt-to-equity ratio has decreased 
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noticeably in recent years. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the increased 
scrutiny from investors and regulators has compelled lessees to increase compliance with 
lease accounting rules meaning the lessee must disclose in notes in the profit and loss account 
the amount charged under the leasing agreement in the present year and the amount of the 
payments to which the entity is committed until the end of the agreement (Dhaliwal et al, 
2011). 
It is important to highlight the most relevant features of leasing (accounting and fiscal 
treatment of leases) but in this dissertation we suggest to take a closer analysis of the decision 
between buy and lease in terms of the corporate tax rate lessees are subject to. 
 2.1 Tax implications in leasing versus purchasing 
Doing business imply frequent decision making. When a firm is confronted with the need to 
acquire assets, one of the questions that may arise is “How?”  
Donaldson (1961), in what was described as the Pecking-Order Theory detected that 
managers preferred to fund investment from retained profits/internal funds rather than use 
external financing tools (in Beattie et al, 2000). 
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009), based on the argument that leasing allows for a higher debt 
capacity, inferred that “leasing ratio is increasing in firm's financial constraints, 
characterized as firms having low internal funds or having a return on internal funds 
exceeding the market interest rate”. This leasing model denotes a pecking order of external 
funds determined by financial constraints: more financially constrained firms prefer to lease 
while less constrained firms purchase (through internal funds or debt). When leasing is 
available, the decision between purchase and lease can be motivated by cost differences 
which is a pure finance choice, or by asset characteristics that make leasing or purchasing a 
more attractive option in asset acquisition (Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009; Beattie et al, 2000). 
Several studies explore the relation between leasing and debt financing, however empirical 
evidence is controversial. Finance theory generally predicts that leasing and debt are 
substitutes to some extent. Marston and Harris (1988), Adedeji & Stapleton (1996) and more 
recently Yan (2006) found that a greater lease proportion leads to less new debt issued, 
suggesting a substitutability relation between debt and leasing. Nevertheless, Ang and 
Peterson (1984) and Lewis and Schallheim (1992) showed that a larger use of debt is 
accompanied by a larger use of leasing, indicating some level of complementarity.  
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More specifically, Beattie et al (2000) show in their study that leasing and debt are somewhat 
substitutes but not in the same proportion with £1 of leasing displacing, on average, £0.23 of 
non-lease debt. This finding is consistent with the idea that lessors bear some risks which does 
not happen in debt financing.  
Despite these contradictory conclusions managers must decide whether to use leasing or debt, 
although evidence shows it is not a linear comparison, neither a straight forward decision 
(Erickson, 1993; Beattie et al, 2000). 
An exhaustive characterization of just the tax implications of the lease-versus-buy decision 
and its interaction with a firm’s overall capital structure, even under the assumption of 
complete markets, can be quite complex (Lewis and Schallheim, 1992; Steven and Hein, 272, 
1995). 
In perfect financial markets, the cost of raising capital for a new investment is purely the rate 
of return that investors would expect to receive in the financial market for investments with 
similar risk. Hence, in the absence of imperfections, all capital sources have the same costs, 
indicating that the value of the firm is kept unchanged no matter the proportion of equity, debt 
and leases in the its capital structure. However, bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information 
are imperfections that make different sources of financing to have different costs and different 
effects on the value of the firm (Ezzell and Vora, 2001). 
Many theories of capital structure imply that, all else the same, the incentive to use debt 
increases with a firm’s marginal tax rate due to the tax deductibility of the interest expense. 
Similarly, leasing models generally predict that firms with low marginal tax rates use 
relatively more leases than firms with high marginal tax rates. The reasoning is that leases 
allow for the transfer of tax shields from firms that cannot fully utilize the associated tax 
deduction (lessees) to firms that can (lessors) (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Graham et al, 
2006; Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Myers et al, 1976; Smith and Wakeman, 1985). 
Most studies address the relation of leasing and taxes considering marginal tax rate which is 
the amount of tax paid on an additional dollar of income. In this dissertation we propose to 
approach the lease versus purchase problematic comparing European countries effective tax 
rate. The effective tax rate for a corporation is the average rate at which its pre-tax profits are 
taxed. As research based of effective tax rate is few and despite the different concepts 
between marginal and effective tax rate, it is acceptable to expect the relation to be the same.  
Despite theoretical deductions, empirically testing for tax effects is difficult because a bogus 
relation exists between the financing decision and many commonly used tax proxies. 
Specifically, both interest expense and lease payments are tax deductible. Thus, a firm that 
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finances its operations with debt or leasing reduces its taxable income, potentially lowering its 
expected marginal tax rate. If not properly considered, this feature of the tax rate can bias an 
experiment in favour of finding a negative correlation between leasing and taxes and against 
finding a positive relation between debt and taxes. However, corporate tax rate is not 
potentially reduced by a lower taxable income because it is the same for all companies, thus 
no bias is introduced as described for the marginal tax rate (Graham et al, 1998). 
The tax saving in terms of present value creates gains to leasing. The leasing models generally 
predict that low tax rate firms should lease more than high tax rate firms. Consistent with this 
prediction, Graham et al (1998) show a negative association between operating leases and the 
corporate marginal tax rate. On the other hand, several studies demonstrate that leasing may 
motivate a firm to use more debt than it would not otherwise since leasing offers the lessee 
the opportunity to transfer some non-debt tax shields to another firm (the lessor), who values 
these tax deductions more and “buys” these tax shields by reducing the leasing payments. 
(DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Ezzell and Vora, 2001; Lewis and Schallheim, 1992; Miller 
and Upton, 1976; Myers et al, 1976).  
If the lessor has a lower tax rate than the owner/lessee this enhances the probable reduction of 
the lease payments and so increasing gains from leasing against debt financing tax shield. A 
more drastic situation that favours leasing is when firms with significant tax-loss carry-
forwards will be tax-exhausted for a period of years, and so unable to take full advantage of 
the tax benefits of ownership, including those from accelerated depreciation and investment 
tax credits (Erickson, 1993; Ezzell and Vora, 2001; Lin, Wang, Wei Chou and Chueh, 2012; 
Steven and Hein, 281, 1995). 
Graham et al (1998) summarized that leasing option for a low tax rate firm is favoured when 
(i) depreciation tax shield is higher in early years, (ii) taxable gain on the disposal of the asset 
is smaller, (iii) larger lease payments occur later in the lease term, or (iv) before-tax discount 
rate is high. Notwithstanding, it is possible to observe situations where a high tax rate firm is 
the lessee. In general, tax legislation and the use of accelerated depreciation plans tend to 
favour conditions under which the low tax rate firm is the lessee. 
Overall, researchers conclude that as effective and marginal tax rate decrease, tax shield from 
debt falls and the relative gains from reduced lease payments increase. So, lessee’s tax rate is 
found to be negatively related to lease usage, since the tax benefit of asset ownership 
increases as the lessee’s marginal tax rate increases. Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) observed 
consistent results with this prediction where a firm’s propensity to lease is negatively related 
to the proxies for its effective tax rate.  
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2.2 Other factors potentially affecting leasing and purchasing cost 
For many years leasing was viewed as a function of firm’s tax status (Myers et al, 1976; 
Lewellen et al, 1976; Miller and Upton, 1976). In the absence of taxes neither lease nor 
purchase could be shown to dominate. In the late 1980s, research shifted to non-tax incentives 
for leasing. One possible key factor for that change in focus was the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
which substantially reduced the tax shelters of asset ownership. Market imperfections such as 
asymmetric information, costs of information gathering, differential tax rates, costs of 
financial distress and bankruptcy costs, potentially affect the relative costs of leases and debt 
and consequently the preference between leasing versus borrowing (Erickson, 1993). 
 
2.2.1 Information asymmetries 
Informational asymmetries between managers and investors can lead to both adverse selection 
and moral hazard costs. Myers and Majluf (1984) establish that if managers are able to issue 
safe debt, adverse selection problem is largely mitigated. For that reason, a pecking order of 
financial securities arises. Because lease payments are senior to payments on debt, Myers and 
Majluf (1984) model suggests that leasing can reduce costs related to the adverse selection 
problem. Consistent with this prediction, gains from leasing are greater for lessees in the high 
information asymmetry group. The reasoning is in line with studies revealing that lease rates 
will be lower than borrowing rates for low information firms (Erickson, 1993; Ezzell and 
Vora, 2001). 
 
2.2.2 Financial distress 
A firm with a high probability of entering financial distress is likely to be able to ex ante 
arrange lease financing on more favourable terms than other forms of financing. The trade off 
theory of capital structure suggests that firms will ex ante balance the tax benefits of debt 
against the expected costs of financial distress. This implies that firms with higher ex ante 
expected costs of financial distress should use less debt (Beattie et al, 2000). 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) suggest that cash-poor or lower rated firms, those likely to face 




2.2.3 Bankruptcy costs 
In relation to secured debt, leasing has the possibility to reduce costs of bankruptcy because of 
the different treatments given to leases and secured debt in the event of bankruptcy. However, 
the prospective of leasing to have a positive impact on bankruptcy costs will only be realized 
for firms that have a low credit quality and so greater probability of bankruptcy (Ezzell and 
Vora, 2001). 
In case of default, as repossession is easier for a lessor than for a secured lender, as leasing 
enables for a stronger form of collateral. Due to the stronger claim protection for a lessor 
provided by retention of asset ownership, the predicted impact on lease rates is smaller than 
the effect on debt rates. Thus, the price differential should favour leasing for financially 
weaker firms (Erickson, 1993; Lin et al, 2012; Rampini and Viswanathan, 2013). 
 
2.2.4 Asset factors 
Smith and Wakeman (1985) highlight asset specific characteristics that may be important in 
the decision to lease. They recognize that assets sensitive to use and maintenance decisions, 
and assets where it is difficult to detect misuse are more likely to be owned. Similarly, highly 
specialized assets are more likely to be owned (Erickson, 1993). 
Several authors discuss that tangible assets are a key determinant of corporate debt capacity. 
Based on the need to collateralize loans with tangible assets, research shows that as leasing 
amounts to a stronger form of collateralization due to the relative ease of repossession, firms 
with low tangible assets will lease more and borrow less (Lin et al, 2012; Rampini and 
Viswanathan, 2013; Smith and Wakeman, 1985). 
Smith and Wakeman (1985) suggest that firms are more likely to buy than lease assets which 









3. Methodology  
In this section there is a detailed description of the methods used in the dissertation to 
approach the main research question.  
The starting point was to searched for a measurable relation between operating leasing in 
terms of fiscal policies and the percentage of assets under operating leasing agreements by 
European country. Operating leasing cost is a sum of scheduled payments made by the lessee 
to the lessor. According to the IFRS rules those payments can be recorded as expenses on an 
accrual basis, reducing the taxable income. However, it is not possible to directly observe the 
amount paid for the operational leases since they are off balance sheet items. Since leasing 
comprises a series of cash payments, we can compare the operational leasing and purchasing 
costs by matching the present value of the leasing cash flows to the purchasing cash outflows. 
In practical terms, a company that chooses to lease an asset under an operating leasing 
agreement rather than purchasing will avoid paying the full price immediately. However, such 
lessee is not entitle to depreciate the asset and so loses the tax shield benefit given to the 
owner.  
Myers et al (1976) illustrate the difference between lease and purchase strategies and define it 
as being equal to the incremental cash-flows discounted at the after-tax interest rate. 
Accordingly, the present value of the difference between leasing and purchasing is 
summarized by Myers et al as: 
 
      ∑
  (   )   
(    (   ))  
 
    (1) 
 
where A is the purchase price of the asset; P is the lease payment in year t; b stands for the 
depreciation of the leased asset in the period t, T is the company's marginal tax rate and kd is 
the required rate of return on debt (interest paid on the loan).  In this model the company's tax 
rate is assumed to be constant over time. 
Although Myers et al (1976) model considers marginal tax rate, it is fair to infer the same 
relations between the variables in the case where T stands for corporate tax rate since, as 
discussed in the literature review, the relevant variables are the same and the behaviour 
follows the same pattern (even though the variation in terms of value may differ). In that 
situation, the difference between the alternative financing strategies is still equal to the 
incremental cash-flows, discounted at the after-tax interest rate (Myers et al, 1976). 
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In 1985, Smith and Wakeman also summarized the present value of the difference in the total 
tax expense between purchasing and leasing. The research introduces new variables, such as 
different tax rates between the owner/lessor and the user/lessee, as well as, profit arising from 
the disposal of the asset, which is a benefit to the owner: 
 
     (     ) (                    )  (          )  (2) 
 
where T0 is the corporate tax rate of the owner/lessor, Tb is the corporate tax rate of the 
user/lessee, Dep is the present value of depreciation, Debt is the present value of the interest 
tax shields from the loan to acquire the asset, Maintenance is the present value of expected 
maintenance costs if these expenses are covered by the lease, Lease is the present value of the 
lease payments, and Gain is the present value of the taxable capital gain from the eventual 
sale of the asset.  
 
Based on these models, we create our own to calculate the present value of operating leasing 
cost. The reason for new model is due to three main points. First, both models assume that the 
sum of the leasing payments are an observable amount, as well as others costs namely 
maintenance. Second, models only reflect the option to buy through debt issuance. Third, the 
model presented by Smith and Wakeman in 1985 (2) highlights the differences in the 
corporate tax rates of the lessor and the lessee. In our model that difference will not be 
considered because we are determining leasing cost from the lessee perspective. This means 
that the difference in corporate tax rates is not a direct gain for the lessee but a negotiable 
margin for the lessor.  
Considering cash outflows as negative values and cash inflows as positive values, we suggest 
the following equations for the option of purchasing cost through internal funds (PC1) and 
through debt issuance (PC2). 
 
          (   )  ∑           (   )      (3) 
 
Where –Inv(1-T) is the investment taken by the company to acquire the asset through internal 
funding eased by a lower tax payment as a consequence of a lower cash base for tax 
collection; Dep*T reflects the present value of depreciation tax shield that the owner is 
entitled which reduces the total cost of purchasing; lastly BV*(1-T) stands for the after tax 
disposal value of the asset that the owner benefits and that potentially decrease the cost of 
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buying (potentially because it is only materialized once the option of selling is realized). 
Finally, the present value of the buying option will be calculated by discounting cash-flows at 
the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
 
      ∑   
    (   )
 
            (4) 
 
When asset acquisition is made through debt issuance, investment in t=0 can be ignored since 
it is an external source of funding that will support the initial cost and that the owner will 
repay along the years. The impact of this is due to the fact that cash-flows are realized in 
different points in time and, considering differential analysis, there is no difference in terms of 
company’s cash before or after debt issuance in t=0. Scheduled payments comprise the 
principal plus the interest divided by the agreed repayment period: 
    (   )
 
, which is an 
average rental payment. For the dissertation purpose the loan repayment period is assumed to 
be equal to the depreciation time length. Average rental payments divide debt reimbursement 
into equal amounts along several periods. This reasoning introduces an error associated with 
time value of money as companies can choose to pay different amounts along the years. Even 
being aware of the limitation of using an average, it is not possible to cover all possibilities 
for the scheduled payments.  
As for any other purchase option, the owner has the benefit given by the depreciation tax 
shield Dep*T. Finally, the present value of the buying option will be calculated by 
discounting cash-flows at the weighted average cost of debt (WACD). 
For the leasing analysis the suggested equation is: 
 
              ∑    (   )     (5) 
 
Where L represents the leasing payments/rent reduced by the tax shield. This tax allowance is 
a result of the decrease in the taxable income as a consequence of leasing being recorded as an 
expense on the balance sheet. 
Considering that the purpose of the dissertation is to assess and evaluate the relation between 
fiscal policies and leasing usage across European countries and as it is not possible to assess 
directly the amount of leasing cost, we examined the difference between leasing and 
purchasing cost. The rationale is to infer what is the total cost of leasing if it is equal to the 
cost of buying? In theory it would be expected that as the inferred leasing cost become larger 
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(meaning that for the leasing to be equal to the purchasing cost a greater amount must be 
spent on leasing) a great percentage of leasing usage would be observed. Therefore, the 
present value of the leasing cost for the lessee is achieved through the equation: 
 
                              (6) 
 
The present value of leasing is calculated by solving the equation in function of L (Leasing 
expense). Cash-flows are discounted at the cost of debt or cost of capital depending on the 
source of financing (debt or internal funds, respectively). 
For the sake of clarity and as final notes, it is important to reinforce the notion that the metric 
does not translate the real cost of leasing but aims to deduct the cost of leasing in comparison 
with the purchasing cost.  
 
 
4. Data Collection 
Data collection aims to portray the data screened to answer the research question and to guide 
the reader throughout the reasoning of information selection.  
4.1 Fiscal Policies 
In this dissertation, leasing is studied as being more than a mere alternative to external 
funding options. A great majority of previous research have analysed leasing versus debt, 
placing leasing as an external financing strategy. Contrary to those studies (extensively 
presented in preceding sections) the purpose of the current study is to challenge leasing as 
opposed to purchasing and assess if there is any pattern across European countries that depict 
a relation between fiscal policies and the penetration of leasing in the market. 
The rationale behind the focus of the analysis in European countries is to gather a 
homogenous sample in terms of business culture. Moreover, variables such as cultural 
patterns are very difficult to accurately translate in numbers and even more challenging to 
incorporate in a metric with financial purposes. Consequently, the data collected comprises 
only European countries both members and non-members of the European Union (EU), in a 
total of 26 countries, 23 being EU members and 3 Non-EU members (see table 3 in appendix) 
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Information concerning fiscal policies was collected resorting to available compilation works 
done by auditing/consulting companies, that provided in a standardized and comparative 
format, fiscal policies concerning leasing across European countries (see KPMG and Deloitte 
research reports
2
) The total number of countries in the sample was restricted by the available 
information regarding fiscal policies, total investment level and new leasing production for 
each country. Therefore, the number of securities under observation from EU countries is 
2550 and from Non-EU countries is 549, totalizing 3099 securities. 
Information was collected and treated following some guidelines/assumptions that are 
described in the following lines. 
 
4.1.1 Depreciation 
To compute the depreciation rate two pieces of information were fundamental: tax 
depreciation rate and depreciation method allowed for tax purposes. 
Concerning the tax depreciation rate it was important and necessary to define a type of asset 
that could be compared throughout the sample. For that purpose industrial 
equipment/machinery was selected. Those types of assets represent a considerable cost for 
companies and involve more than only the acquisition cost: maintenance, fast wear and tear, 
great and rapid technology improvements that demand frequent updating.  
Considering the depreciation tax rate, information collected comprises the depreciation 
allowed to the owner which represents the depreciation tax shield in the case of purchasing. 
Since the aim of the dissertation is not to assess the real cost of leasing but to measure that 
cost in a comparative manner and, as information about residual value was not available, 
equipment/machinery was completely depreciated which means the final book value was 
zero. Accordingly, the timeline under analysis was defined by the book value, being the last 
year the one where book value is equal to zero. 
In relation to the depreciation method allowed for tax purposes, some countries set just one 
possibility and others make it more flexible and present more options. In those cases the 
depreciation method chosen was the one that most benefit leasing, which means higher 
depreciation rate in the first years. The rationale behind this is to replicate how options are 
                                                 
2
 Deloitte (2012). “International tax: Bulgaria Highlights 2012”. 
Deloitte (2012). “International tax: Estonia Highlights 2012”. 
Deloitte (2012). “International tax: Netherlands Highlights 2012”. 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited (2012). “Taxation and Investment in Italy 2012: research, relevance and 
reliability”. 
Leaseurope and KPMG (2012), “European Leasing”, Asset Finance Tax Network Publication 
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confronted in a real situation and to fully represent the potential benefits from leasing. 
Information collected is summarized in table 4 in appendix. 
 
4.1.2 Corporate Tax Rate  
Corporate tax rate was preferred over specific marginal or categorized corporate tax rates. The 
corporate tax rate used refers to the main category of tax rate provided by KPMG and Deloitte 
research studies for the individual countries.   
Given that the final objective is to analyse the country as a unit, corporate tax rate was a better 
proxy than marginal tax rate. Marginal tax rate defines tax levels within the country according 
to the profit generated as opposed to corporate tax rate which is a standard tax rate applied to 




For some countries the above mentioned guidelines do not fit the information available. In 
these situations some adjustments were made having in mind the applicability of the metric, 
the purpose of the study and the minimization of bias. 
Estonia has a peculiar tax system where since the year 2000 there is no corporate tax rate and 
income is only taxed at the moment it is distributed (dividends). Accordingly, tax depreciation 
is not necessary which means no tax depreciation rate is defined by the authorities. The 
impact of this situation in the study is due to the fact that the book value is derived from the 
depreciation rate (1-Sum of the depreciation) meaning that the asset would have a constant 
book value of 100%, which is clearly unreal. Moreover, accounting depreciation is also not 
available and so the valid decision that kept the cohesion of the study was to go back in time, 
before the new tax regime, and consider the tax depreciation rate previous to year 2000. For 
the dissertation purpose the tax depreciation rate for industrial equipment/machinery was 
consider to be 40% in the first year, declining until book value is equal to zero. 
A different problem appeared in the analysis of the Czech Republic’s and Poland’s tax 
system. As explained before, when more than one depreciation method was allowed, we 
considered the one that depreciates a higher percentage in the first years. However, we had to 
break this rule for these two countries. In the Czech and Polish tax systems the higher 
percentage method are specific transformations of the accelerated and declining balance 
methods, respectively. These transformations imply that the depreciation rate is determined 
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by the residual value, which is not available information. Hence in these countries, we had to 
resort to straight-line depreciation, where we depreciate less in the first years than with the 
accelerated or declining balance methods. 
4.2 Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) is mainly used for financial purposes and reflects 
the risk undertaken and the return demanded by firms when an investment is considered.  
As explain before, one of the parameters for the dissertation is to test leasing as opposed to 
purchase and not just an alternative to debt. Accordingly, a proper analysis of leasing versus 
purchasing should reflect the higher risk and return that the acquisition through internal funds 
represents for a company. Consequently, WACC is a great proxy as it mirrors firm's cost of 
capital by incorporating all capital sources and proportionately weighting them. 
As the metric (developed and explain previously in the methodology) intends to replicate 
companies’ conditions under decision making, the appropriate risk/return rate is the one that 
companies face, as opposed to the country rate. Hence, WACC was collected for all 
companies register in the stock market screened by country. 
Data was extracted through Bloomberg and reflects the values of WACC in the period 
concerning 01/01/2011 to 31/12/2011. As financial results may vary widely with little 
changes, for homogeneity and robustness reasons, all information was collected for the same 
year. 
WACC values were integrated in the metric to reflect the cost of the purchase option as well 
as to discount to present values the cash outflows incurred in the future. The summary of the 
information regarding WACC is displayed in table 6 in appendix. 
4.3 Weighted Average Cost of Debt 
The Weighted Average Cost of Debt (WACD) is a financial tool that captures the return 
demanded (interest) on external financing sources. Therefore, it reflects the total additional 
cost the firm must incur besides the principal payment. 
A great number of studies have approached leasing as an alternative to debt. However, this 
dissertation challenges operational leasing versus purchasing. When companies evaluate the 
acquisition option, resorting to debt should be considered since it can be beneficial, as 
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financial theories claim (capital structure theory). So, in order to replicate that reasoning, debt 
versus operational leasing could not be disregarded.  
WACD was collected for all companies register in the stock market and screened by country. 
In accordance with the explanation given for the WACC values collected, WACD follows the 
same logic and tests the leasing strategy at a company level. For this, the appropriate rate of 
return demanded by external funding entities is the one that companies face, as opposed to the 
country rate. 
Data was extracted through Bloomberg and reflects the values of WACD from 01/01/2011 to 
31/12/2011. The summary of the information gathered is shown in table 7 in appendix. 
WACD values were integrated in the metric to reflect the cost of the purchase option through 




5. Variables Tested 
This section describes the variables selected and tested to answer the research question and to 
reach important and significant conclusions.  
5.1 Leasing Penetration Rate 
Leasing Penetration Rate (LPR) is a ratio that represents the incremental leasing usage for 
equipment/machinery in relation to the total investment. LPR constitutes in our perspective a 
better proxy for leasing usage than considering simply leasing production. The reasoning is 
that it mitigates the differences in market size across countries. 
It is important to bear in mind that operating leasing benefits go beyond fiscal advantages and 
as the report of the Leaseurope for 2011 shows, companies have different reasons to use 
leasing. Nevertheless, it is acceptable to believe that fiscal policies can motivate companies to 
adjust the number of assets under operating leasing and for that, testing the correlation 
between LPR and the present value of operating leasing calculated through the metrics can 
depict significant reasons for operating leasing choice rather than purchasing.   
LPR is calculated by dividing new leasing production of a specific year by gross fixed capital 
formation for the same year. The result illustrates how much of the investment in that period 
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was financed through leasing (percentage of leasing relative from total investment in fixed 
capital).  
Information for the new leasing production in million Euros was extracted from Leaseurope 
Annual report 2011 for the 26 countries in the sample. Concerning total investment, data 
selection was narrowed down to investment in fixed capital in line with the depreciation for 
industrial equipment/machinery. Data for gross fixed capital formation in million Euros for 




Table 8 in appendix summarizes the information extracted for both variables and the result of 
leasing penetration rate for each country in the sample. 
5.2 Gross Domestic Product Growth 
Data concerning GDP was gathered from Eurostat for the year of 2011 for all countries in the 
sample and is displayed in table 10 in appendix. The percentage growth reflects the variation 
of GDP in volume from previous year (2010). We will later alert to the fact that GDP includes 
gross investment as one of its components, which will have implications in our correlations 
analysis. 
5.3 Investment Growth 
Investment growth is a variable closely related with GDP however, as GDP is influence by 
different factors, it is important to analyze in isolation how investment behaves across the 
countries in the sample.  
For the dissertation purpose, it is pertinent to test if a correlation between the investment 
growth and the usage of leasing can be found. The importance relies on the detailed 
information that can be extracted by making a direct link between investment growth and the 
percentage of new investment in leasing from the total investment in fixed capital (leasing 
penetration rate).  
Information for investment growth was collected from Eurostat for the year of 2011, 
reflecting the variation from the previous year, and is summarized in table 9 in appendix. 
 
                                                 
3
 Eurostat (2011), European Economic Indicators [Online] (Updated 15 May 2013) Available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/euroindicators/peeis [Accessed 16 May 2013]. 
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5.4 Investment as a percentage of GDP 
Finally, and to avoid differences due to market size, it is important to use a variable that 
assesses the representativeness of the investment level in each country in the sample. For that, 
the differences in market size are minimized by dividing the total investment by the GDP 
(both in million euros), reflecting the impact of the investment in the production level of a 
country (table 10 in appendix). 
This variable is fundamental to examine if there is any relation between the fiscal policies and 
the level of investment in comparison to the GDP.  
 
 
6.  Results’ Analysis and Discussion 
 This section will examine the results obtained through SPSS regarding the research question. 
Before critically explore the results and discuss their impacts in the study, it is important to 
highlight once more, that the dissertation aim to assess a possible relation between the choice 
of operating leasing over purchasing (whether the acquisition is made through internal funds 
or debt issuance) and the fiscal policies across a sample of 26 European countries. For that, a 
cross sectional study was performed as it involves the observation of a subset of the 
population, which in this case is a sample of all the European countries, in a specific period in 
time. Cross sectional studies are characterized by describing a feature of the population and 
so, they are descriptive studies where variables are measured simultaneously. However, this 
type of research method does not test or establish a cause and effect relationship. 
6.1 Present value of operating leasing as a function of the purchasing cost 
The present value of operating leasing as a function of the purchasing cost (PVOL) was 
calculated through the metrics described in the methodology section. Since the results refer to 
cost, they are presented as a negative cash flow (cash outflow). 
Looking at the descriptive statistics displayed in table 1, the average result for the PVOL is 
not that different between the option of acquiring through internal funds or through debt 
issuance; -1,432 and -1,349 respectively. Differences in the estimated values for PVOL across 
countries in the sample are the lowest within the variables under study, as can be seen in table 
11 in appendix, where standard deviation is 0,978 for PVOL as a function of purchasing 
through internal funds and 0,994 for PVOL as a function of purchasing through debt. 
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Perhaps the most relevant fact to be highlighted is the one concerning Turkey where the 
results show positive values for the cost of leasing through internal funds and debt. These 
results raise the possibility of operational leases represent an advantage over purchasing from 
a fiscal policy point of view. Nevertheless, the results for the Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
show that there is no significant correlation between PVOL for both purchasing options 
(internal funds or debt) and the variables considered in the study, which means there is no 
evidence that fiscal rules play a determinant role in the choice to use operational leases.  
 6.2 Leasing Penetration Rate 
Leasing penetration rate (LPR) for the year 2011 displays the greatest results within the 
variables under study for both standard deviation and range, as can be seen in table 1. LPR 
shows the greatest difference between the lowest and the highest value observed, with a range 
of 99,123 and the larger value for the standard deviation (25,653), meaning that LPR is the 
variable where values across the countries in the sample show the highest level of dispersion. 
Specifically Estonia show a peculiar percentage of leasing penetration rate, with 99,12% of 
equipments under operating leasing contracts from all the investment in gross fixed capital, as 
opposed to Turkey that exhibits the lowest level of leasing penetration rate with 0,03%. 
Despite opposite realities in terms of leasing usage, Estonia and Turkey show the most 
favourable amounts regarding the cost of leasing as a function of the purchasing cost. Turkey 
is the single country in the sample showing a clear advantage for leasing over purchase in 
terms of fiscal policies but Estonia is immediately after, even though it does not show a clear 
benefit. This clear disparity between variables put in evidence that company’s choice between 









Range Minimum Maximum 
Present Value of Leasing 
as a function of 
purchasing through 
internal funds 
26 -1,432 0,978610 4,57 -4,48 0,094 
Present Value of Leasing 
as a function of 
purchasing through debt 
26 -1,349 0,9934 4,163 -3,89187 0,27 
Leasing Penetration Rate 
for 2011 
26 19,51 25,65 99,12 0,0303410 99,15 
Investment Growth for 
2011 
26 4,305 11,85 50,75 -19,5 31,25 
GDP Growth for 2011 26 2,109 3,1025 17,35 -7,15 10,20 
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leasing and purchasing may not be related with fiscal rules as it can be seen in table 2, where 
no significant correlation was established between the present value of operating leasing cost 
as a function of the purchase cost and the leasing penetration rate. 
 Though, the analysis of Pearson’s correlation coefficient suggest a significant and positive 
correlation at the level of 0,05 between the leasing penetration rate and the GDP growth with 
Pearson’s r equal to 0,410. These results indicate that, for European countries, as the 
percentage of GDP growth rises, there is an increase preference for operational leasing 






Table 2 - Findings for the Pearson’s correlation analysis performed through SPSS for all the variables under study. 
Pearson’s correlations significant at the level of 0,01 and 0,05are emphasised as indicated in the legend. 
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Present Value of 








 -0,132 0,160 0,231 0,227 
Significant 
Level (2 tailed) 
 0,000 0,520 0,434 0,256 0,255 
Present Value of 







 1 -0.127 0,082 0,188 0,037 
Significant 
Level (2 tailed) 
0,000  0,536 0,690 0,357 0,857 
Leasing Penetration 
Rate for 2011 
Pearson 
Correlation 




Level (2 tailed) 











Level (2 tailed) 
0,434 0,690 0,082  0,000 0,003 








 1 0,547 
Significant 
Level (2 tailed) 
0,256 0,357 0,038 0,000  0,004 
Investment as a 










Level (2 tailed) 
0,255 0,857 0,823 0,003 0,004  
 
a - correlation is significant at 0,01 level 




6.3 Total Investment Growth 
Concerning total investment growth for the year 2011, nine countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and United Kingdom) show a 
negative growth regarding total investment. Negative values indicate that between the year of 
2010 and the year of 2011 there were a decrease of the investment level in fixed capital in 
those countries.  
Total investment growth also shows the greatest range between the minimum and the 
maximum values observed within the sample. However, the most relevant fact concerning this 
variable is again related to Turkey.   
Turkey shows the lowest level of leasing penetration rate for the year 2011 even though it has 
the most favourable results concerning the present value of operating leasing as a function of 
the purchasing cost, for both acquisition options – internal funds or debt issuance - with 
positive values for both purchasing strategies. Moreover, Turkey has the highest growth level 
regarding total investment in fixed capital throughout the sample. Those facts illustrate a 
situation where investment is highly sustained through purchase. We cannot assess or explain 
the relation between the favourable results achieved for the present value of operating leasing 
and the low levels of leasing usage in a country with the highest investment growth, 
nevertheless it is an important fact for the analysis and it may be addressed in future studies. 
Moreover, examining Pearson’s correlation coefficient, we can observe a positive and 
significant correlation at the level of 0,01 between investment in fixed capital growth and 
GDP growth as it is expected by the expenditure method to compute the GDP. Even though 
the correlation between GDP growth and investment growth was not surprising, it becomes 
relevant for the dissertation when interpreted with the results for the leasing penetration rate 
that are also positively correlated with GDP growth. This means that as GDP growth 
increases across the countries in the sample, leasing penetration rate shows greater levels of 
growth in comparison to the investment in fixed capital. So, operational leases have a higher 
representativeness in total investment in fixed capital as GDP growth escalates. 
6.4 Gross Domestic Product Growth 
As explained previously, GDP is a great indicator of a country’s economy. Regarding GDP 
growth for the year 2011 statistics indicate an average of 2,109% and a standard deviation of 
3,109. Extremes values are characterized by two countries, Greece and Portugal, that show 
negative values, -7,15% and -1,55% respectively, which means that between 2010 and 2011 
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the economy of those countries was in recession.  In contrast, Turkey displays the highest 
GDP growth with 10,2%  in line with the high level of investment.  
6.5 Investment as a percentage of GDP 
Investment as a percentage of GDP is a variable that illustrates the impact of investment in the 
GDP and so eliminates the variances in investment and GDP across countries arising from 
differences in the maturity/development of the economy. 
The results indicate that on average, 20,47% of the GDP of the countries in the sample, is due 
to investment in gross fixed capital for the year 2011 and differences across the sample 
measured by standard deviation are significantly lower than for total investment growth, with 
a value of 3,016 in opposite to 11,854. 
The highest value observed for this variable belongs to Romania which has a low percentage 
of leasing usage with 0,178% for the leasing penetration rate in 2011.  
 
 
7. Main conclusions and Future Research 
The aim of this dissertation is to study the role of fiscal policies in the decision making 
between operational leasing and purchasing across European countries from the lessee point 
of view. Conclusions about cause and effect relation cannot be drawn from the results as this 
is a cross sectional study. Nonetheless, important correlations can provide a direction and 
contribute for future research.  
One of the main objectives of this study is to be a reliable portrait of the present situation. 
Therefore, information was collected for the year 2011 as it is the most recent period for 
which European countries already had published information.  
Findings show that there is no evidence that fiscal rules play a determinant role in the choice 
to use operational leases. However, there are some interesting results that should be discussed. 
In line with what was described in the results section, is not possible to assess or explain the 
inconsistency between the favourable results observed in the present value of operating 
leasing for Turkey and the total investment in fixed capital growth, which are the highest in 
the sample and that contrast with the low levels of leasing usage.  
It is also interesting and perhaps relevant to observe how leasing usage follows GDP growth 
trends. It was expected, based on theory, to observe a positive correlation between GDP 
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growth and total investment growth. However, a not so obvious correlation stood out and 
revealed that as GDP growth increases across the countries in the sample, leasing usage 
(LPR) shows higher levels of growth than total investment in fixed capital. This means that as 
the percentage of GDP growth rises there is an increase preference for operational leasing 
translated by a greater penetration rate. Still, it cannot be said that there is a cause and effect 
relation since no temporal analysis was performed. 
Results must be discussed considering the limitations present in the study and future research 
should try to overcome them. One of the limitations is a consequence of information not being 
collected or disclosed for some countries, reducing the sample to 26 countries. Another 
limitation has to do with operational leases usage. Available information includes in one 
single value the amount of equipment under operating leasing and hire purchasing (a type of 
financial leasing) agreements without enough figures to distinguish the amounts 
corresponding to each type. This may have influenced the results because introduces 
information concerning a type of leasing that is not being studied and the percentage 
corresponding to operational leases from the total amount is probably different for each 
country. The third limitation is related to the assumption of average rental payments. To 
address the issue of debt reimbursement, it was assumed that companies would pay an equal 
amount along the repayment period. These equal amounts are actually an average that 
introduces an error as a consequence of the time value of money. Even though, the error 
affects all the countries, the impacts have different proportions (depending on the value of the 
discount rate) and the effect may be positive or negative depending where a higher amount is 
repaid (sooner or later). 
Despite the limitations, there may be reasons other than taxes, such as economic or financial 
reasons, that may explain the differences in the level of operational leases across European 
countries. Leaseurope annual report for 2011 shows that reasons for the choice of leasing are 
significantly different across European countries. Reality is in fact a complex combination of 
dimensions that influence operational leases and that go beyond fiscal rules. The Leaseurope 
report describes some of those advantages:  
 the ability of the lessee to finance 100% of the asset without guarantees or collateral; 
 the capacity to improve working capital management by spreading payments over the 
asset’s life time, which can ultimately be compared with purchasing through debt but 
that differentiates from it by alleviating the consequences linked to ownership, such as 




 the flexibility to change the equipment at the end of the leasing contract or before for 
purposes of upgrade or cost reduction; 
 the agility to easily adapt to the fluctuations of the demand. 
As final considerations, it is important to emphasize that operating lease is a complex tool and 
certain features are very hard to quantify and can be closely linked with a company’s strategy 
and liquidity, economic situation of a country, maturity of the industry or even competitive 
level. Although many studies compare it to debt and conclude they may be identical or even 
interchangeable, differences between them are significant and goes from accounting, strategic 
direction, economic cost, fiscal policies and financial situation. This thesis focused one 
variable, fiscal rules, however companies should try to approach all factors and match them 
























8.1 Sample Structure 
Table 3 – List of countries in the sample organized by European and Non-European Union 






























Members in 2011 
Non-European Union 
Members in 2011 
 Austria Norway 
 Belgium Switzerland 
 Bulgaria Turkey 
 Cyprus  
 Czech Republic  
 Denmark  
 Estonia  
 Finland  
 France  
 Germany  
 Greece  
 Italy  
 Latvia  
 Luxemburg  
 Netherlands  
 Poland  
 Portugal  
 Romania  
 Slovakia  
 Slovenia  
 Spain  
 Sweden  
 United Kingdom  




Table 4 – Summary of the depreciation method and depreciation rate allowed for tax purposes 
for equipment/machinery. Information refers to the year 2011 and was collected through 
available work from auditing/consulting companies. Some countries allow only one method 
for depreciation others set more than one possibility. In those cases the option was to choose 
the one that leads to a higher depreciation rate in the first years.  
 
Country Depreciation Method 
Depreciation Rate 
Year 1 Year2 Subsequent Years 
Austria straight line 20% 20% 20% 
Belgium straight line or declining balance 
1
 40% 24% 20% 
Bulgaria straight line 30% 30% 30% 
Cyprus no information 10% 10% 10% 
Czech 
Republic 
straight line and accelerated 
2 
11% 22,25% 22,25% 
D nmark decline balance 25,0% 18,8% =(1-Sum_Depreciation))*0,25 
Estonia Declining balance 40% 24,00% =(1-Sum_Depreciation))*0,40 
Finland declining balance 25,0% 18,8% =(1-Sum_Depreciation))*0,25 
France straight line, declining balance 
2
 32,14% 21,81% =(1-Sum_Depreciation))*0,3214 
Germany straight line 14,29% 14,29% 14,29% 
Greece straight line 6,67% 6,67% 6,67% 
Italy straight line 17,50% 17,50% 17,50% 
Latvia declining balance 40,00% 24,0% =(1-Sum_Depreciation))*0,40 
Luxembourg straight line and declining balance 
2
 
30,00% 21,00% =(1-Sum_Depreciation))*0,30 
Netherlands straight line 20% 20% 20% 
Norway declining balance 20% 16,00% =(1-Sum_Depreciation))*0,20 
Poland straight line or reduced balance 
2
 25% 25% 25% 
Portugal straight line or declining balance 
2
 37,5% 23,44% =(1-Sum_Depreciation))*0,375 




50,00% 12,50% 12,50% 
Slovakia straight line or accelerated 
2 
8,3% 8,3% 8,3% 
Slovenia straight line 20% 20% 20% 
Spain straight line 12% 12% 12% 
Sweden straight line or declining balance 30% 21% 20% 
 Switzerland straight line (most used); declining 




15% 15% 15% 









18,0% 14,8% =(1-Sum_Depreciation))*0,18 
 
1. Tax law allows the companies to switch among methods along the depreciation period 






8.3 Corporate Tax Rate 
Table 5 – Corporate tax rate for the year 2011 regarding the countries in the sample. 
 
Country 
Corporate Tax Rate 
in 2011 
Austria 25,00% 





































8.4 Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
Table 6 – Description of the sample examined for each country regarding the data collected 
for weighted average cost of capital (WACC). For each country WACC was collected for all 
companies in the stock market available on Bloomberg [online] for the year 2011. In the first 
column it is possible to see the number of securities analyzed for each country and in the next 













Austria 19 9,172947 3,472173 15,00433 3,934741 
Belgium 12 8,480501 1,803529 14,86373 5,798269 
Bulgaria 14 6,188709 2,394694 10,73221 3,445001 
Cyprus 13 10,22484 1,910002 11,85255 6,572905 
Czech Republic 3 5,531031 0,523474 6,114994 5,1039 
Denmark 160 7,120929 3,493399 21,05467 -4,54288 
Estonia 4 12,03532 4,083296 17,8525 9,192527 
Finland 36 9,717501 1,718534 11,39547 3,583766 
France 154 8,252177 2,442324 13,9201 3,18313 
Germany 35 9,448882 1,930593 12,48042 3,72471 
Greece 302 77,98702 65,71572 586,8407 3,833068 
Italy 304 8,553072 1,918296 13,16142 3,21852 
Latvia 12 3,25253 2,556964 6,412572 -3,51071 
Luxemburg 15 9,240637 2,677736 16,20451 6,658574 
Netherlands 71 8,341531 2,538218 20,19449 3,237082 
Norway 226 8,248995 3,492296 16,22078 2,795183 
Poland 236 9,209176 2,609469 32,89393 3,101191 
Portugal 98 11,80404 5,171684 20,40352 -24,8599 
Romania 18 11,572 6,741448 21,18698 -7,67719 
Slovakia 87 5,073117 3,126081 15,08441 1,366284 
Slovenia 179 5,444447 5,804407 44,851 0,163005 
Spain 169 8,000736 1,854002 12,74284 3,579927 
Sweden 138 8,373572 4,066264 31,26299 -17,9701 
Switzerland 9 11,12889 4,392489 17,69413 4,817162 
Turkey 314 14,03791 1,224924 18,76863 10,64357 









8.5 Weighted Average Cost of Debt 
Table 7 – The table contains the description of the sample examined for each country 
regarding the data collected for weighted average cost of debt (WACD). For each country 
WACD was collected for all companies in the stock market available on Bloomberg 
[online] for the year 2011. In the first column it is possible to see the number of 



















Austria 19 3,508110 0,352060 4,131300 3,067343 
Belgium 12 4,403842 0,871838 5,556720 1,882527 
Bulgaria 14 3,420497 0,671221 4,792321 2,369654 
Cyprus 13 4,544384 1,042367 7,384709 3,360912 
Czech Republic 3 4,645793 0,523474 6,114994 5,1039 
Denmark 160 1,886616 1,128258 4,858357 0 
Estonia 4 3,163958 4,083296 17,8525 9,192527 
Finland 36 4,141004 1,625664 7,084403 1,616419 
France 154 4,104293 0,964249 6,322023 1,117887 
Germany 35 3,714723 0,961557 5,417555 2,215236 
Greece 302 103,6093 81,61186 610,3164 1,310729 
Italy 304 4,750398 1,221854 8,608718 1,864579 
Latvia 12 2,078852 1,348611 3,318164 0 
Luxemburg 15 5,071143 3,573191 16,42268 1,68938 
Netherlands 71 3,492853 0,786086 5,492168 1,590432 
Norway 226 3,196031 0,610271 4,307161 0 
Poland 236 4,734158 1,763551 8,962519 0,279458 
Portugal 98 11,74455 4,981518 22,17768 3,070306 
Romania 18 4,921316 1,794809 8,114669 2,478915 
Slovakia 87 1,358036 0,739178 2,532727 0 
Slovenia 179 1,509534 0,773985 3,011369 0 
Spain 169 4,571109 1,45692 11,50829 0,696441 
Sweden 138 2,777106 1,046218 5,069132 0 
Switzerland 9 3,343555 0,468156 4,363761 2,916815 
Turkey 314 10,67418 2,232007 15,93812 0 
United Kingdom 471 3,157269 1,150793 8,217354 0 
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8.6 Leasing Penetration Rate 
Table 8 - Leasing penetration rate illustrates the amount of new investment under leasing 
agreements relative to all the investment made during 2011 in fixed capital. In the first two 
columns the information presented refers to the new production of equipment leased and hire 
purchased in 2011 and gross fixed capital formation in 2011, gathered from Leaseurope 
Annual report for 2011 and Eurostat, respectively. The last column shows the result for the 
relative amount of equipment under leasing agreements based on previous information. 
 
Country 
New production of 
equipment leased and hire 
purchased 2011  
(Million Euros) 
Gross fixed capital 




Austria 5439,57 14045,6 0,38727929 
Belgium 6715,45 16393,75 0,409634769 
Bulgaria 543,2 1452,85 0,373885811 
Cyprus 232,5 652,325 0,35641743 
Czech Republic 3046,73 7508,375 0,405777548 
Denmark 5366,01 9401,85 0,570739801 
Estonia 744 750,35 0,991537283 
Finland 3600 8368,6 0,43017948 
France 33902 86305 0,392816175 
Germany 45550 109698 0,415230907 
Greece 256,4 7129,875 0,03596136 
Italy 16832 66433,85 0,253364813 
Latvia 516,66 712,025 0,725620589 
Luxemburg 294 1932,075 0,152168006 
Netherlands 4052 24827 0,163209409 
Norway 4702,31 13158,95 0,357346901 
Poland 7162,43 17670,45 0,405333763 
Portugal 2350 7065,3 0,332611496 
Romania 1154,27 6467,1 0,178483401 
Slovakia 1694 3000,4 0,564591388 
Slovenia 733,05 1486,525 0,493129951 
Spain 7560,79 51943,25 0,145558663 
Sweden 10254,71 15515,3 0,66094178 
Switzerland 8235,8 18575,75 0,443362987 
Turkey 834,12 27491,5 0,030341014 






8.7 Total investment growth  
Table 9 – Information gathered concerning the total investment growth is summarized in the 
table below. The values represent the percentage growth for 2011 compared with the total 
investment in 2010. Nine countries show negative growth, meaning that the investment level 
decreased from 2010. The lowest value is observed in Portugal (-19,5%) as opposed to 







































8.8 GDP growth; GDP in millions and gross fixed capital formation as a 
percentage of GDP growth 
Table 10 – In the table below is displayed information regarding variables to be tested against 
the metrics’ results and leasing penetration rate. These variables are well known for being a 
great indicator of a country’s economic health. They represent the production level and 
economic growth of a country. Data concerning GDP was gathered from Eurostat for the year 
2011. Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP growth (%)  avoid differences 
due to market size by dividing the total investment in fixed capital by the GDP (both in 


























Gross fixed capital 
formation as a 
percentage of GDP 
growth (%) 
Austria 2,75 14045,6 14,08 
Belgium 1,8 16393,75 22,76 
Bulgaria 1,875 1452,85 19,94 
Cyprus 0,55 652,325 64,80 
Czech Republic 1,925 7508,375 21,08 
Denmark 1,125 9401,85 50,73 
Estonia 8,35 750,35 11,87 
Finland 2,85 8368,6 15,09 
France 1,7 86305 23,11 
Germany 3,075 109698 13,50 
Greece -7,15 7129,875 -0,50 
Italy 0,375 66433,85 67,56 
Latvia 5,4 712,025 13,44 
Luxemburg 1,65 1932,05 9,22 
Netherlands 1,025 24827 15,92 
Norway 1,25 13158,95 28,59 
Poland 4,5 17592,13 9,05 
Portugal -1,55 7065,3 -21,46 
Romania 2,1 6483,375 8,48 
Slovakia 3,25 3000,4 17,37 
Slovenia 0,625 1486,525 78,90 
Spain 0,425 51943,25 34,25 
Sweden 3,8 15515,3 17,39 
Switzerland 1,925 18575,75 23,03 
Turkey 10,2 27491,5 0,30 
United Kingdom 1 72940,25 51,92 
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8.9 Present value of the operating leasing cost as a result of the metric 
Tables 11 – Results obtained for the present value of operating leasing cost as a function of 
the purchasing cost through internal funds and through debt issuance are exhibit in the table 
below. The values represent the cost of leasing and that is why they are presented as negative 
values. The results should be interpreted as representing how much must the present value of 
operating leasing cost be to equal the present value of the cost of purchasing.  
 
 
Present value of operating leasing cost as a function of the 
purchasing cost  
 
Through internal funds 
(WACC) 
Through debt (WACD) 
Country Average Average 
Austria -1,04484 -0,85751 
Belgium -0,87966 -0,11975 
Bulgaria -0,36894 -0,1973 
Cyprus -2,72344 -3,15312 
Czech Republic -1,27802 -1,14598 
Denmark -2,39813 -1,64985 
Estonia -0,28933 -1,42768 
Finland -1,62651 -2,1229 
France -1,24889 -1,32986 
Germany -1,9278 -1,89507 
Greece -0,97310 -1,440968 
Italy -1,53157 -1,30986 
Latvia -1,3521 -1,46767 
Luxemburg -1,28626 -1,5324 
Netherlands -1,13766 -0,96624 
Norway -2,36352 -3,02964 
Poland -0,62398 -0,47686 
Portugal -0,70065 -0,83161 
Romania -0,29515 -0,42877 
Slovakia -4,47964 -3,89187 
Slovenia -1,18356 -0,94834 
Spain -2,48233 -2,48139 
Sweden -0,71979 -0,56363 
Switzerland -1,64258 -1,77158 
Turkey 0,093795 0,271709 
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